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'Barghouti sets up inner Fatah revolt'
The ruling Fatah faction headed by PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is facing a major crisis after scores of young guard activists resigned over the weekend, accusing senior officials of mismanagement and corruption.
The crisis is seen as the worst since Yasser Arafat founded Fatah 40 years ago.
Moreover, it is seen as a direct challenge to Abbas, who is being accused of foot-dragging with regards to his earlier promise to inject fresh and younger blood into Fatah, the largest faction in the PLO.
Jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti is believed to have orchestrated the rebellion against the top leadership of Fatah, a Palestinian Authority official told The Jerusalem Post.
He said Barghouti met in prison last week with Jamal Shobaki and Kadoura Fares, who represent the young guard in Fatah, and discussed with them the possibility of announcing mass resignations in the faction.
"Barghouti gave them the green light to declare an intifada against the Fatah Central Committee, which consists of long-time Arafat loyalists," the official added.
"This is an intifada of the young leadership against the old guard," said a top Fatah official here. "The young Fatah leaders are fed up with empty promises and want to see real changes."
The young leaders who quit are all from the West Bank. They said the revolt is directed against veteran Fatah leaders who returned with Arafat from exile in 1994 and who serve as members of the Fatah Central Committee.
Sources said at least 32 operatives resigned from two Fatah-run bodies in the West Bank on Friday. They include members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and former ministers, the sources added.
"Our decision is final and we won't backtrack," said Maher Ghnaim, a spokesman for the rebels. "We will continue with our protest to stop the deterioration in Fatah that is a result of mismanagement on the part of the Fatah Central Committee."
Ghnaim said he and his colleagues were worried by the results of the last municipal elections in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas won a majority of seats.
The young Fatah leaders fear that, unless their faction reforms and introduces democracy, Hamas would also make a strong showing in next July's election for the Palestinian Legislative Council.
"This step is not aimed at confronting the old guard, rather it is an attempt to save Fatah from disintegration," Ghnaim explained.
The showdown in Fatah comes five months before the faction is due to hold its first elections since 1989.
During his election campaign earlier this year, Abbas, under pressure from young activists who demanded a shake-up, promised to hold elections in Fatah in August. But the young Fatah leaders fear that Abbas and veteran Fatah leaders are once again seeking to sideline them.
Fares, who met with Barghouti in prison, said the resignations were a message to the leadership to speed up serious reforms to regain the popularity that Fatah has lost in recent years.
He accused top Fatah leader Hani al-Hassan and members of the Fatah Central Committee of plotting to steal the vote in the August election.
"They are working to corrupt people in Fatah and to drive a wedge between them," he said. "They are trying to get rid of some young activists and promote others so that the old guard could continue controlling Fatah. This is totally unacceptable."
Shobaki, another rebel leader, said he and his friends were hoping that there would be more democracy in Fatah in the aftermath of Arafat's death. "Unfortunately, we have discovered that nothing has changed since Arafat's death," he said. "Fatah needs an internal revolution to reorganize its affairs on democratic bases."
Continued
1 | 2 | Next »
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1109995582046
Moreover, it is seen as a direct challenge to Abbas, who is being accused of foot-dragging with regards to his earlier promise to inject fresh and younger blood into Fatah, the largest faction in the PLO.
Jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti is believed to have orchestrated the rebellion against the top leadership of Fatah, a Palestinian Authority official told The Jerusalem Post.
He said Barghouti met in prison last week with Jamal Shobaki and Kadoura Fares, who represent the young guard in Fatah, and discussed with them the possibility of announcing mass resignations in the faction.
"Barghouti gave them the green light to declare an intifada against the Fatah Central Committee, which consists of long-time Arafat loyalists," the official added.
"This is an intifada of the young leadership against the old guard," said a top Fatah official here. "The young Fatah leaders are fed up with empty promises and want to see real changes."
The young leaders who quit are all from the West Bank. They said the revolt is directed against veteran Fatah leaders who returned with Arafat from exile in 1994 and who serve as members of the Fatah Central Committee.
Sources said at least 32 operatives resigned from two Fatah-run bodies in the West Bank on Friday. They include members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and former ministers, the sources added.
"Our decision is final and we won't backtrack," said Maher Ghnaim, a spokesman for the rebels. "We will continue with our protest to stop the deterioration in Fatah that is a result of mismanagement on the part of the Fatah Central Committee."
Ghnaim said he and his colleagues were worried by the results of the last municipal elections in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas won a majority of seats.
The young Fatah leaders fear that, unless their faction reforms and introduces democracy, Hamas would also make a strong showing in next July's election for the Palestinian Legislative Council.
"This step is not aimed at confronting the old guard, rather it is an attempt to save Fatah from disintegration," Ghnaim explained.
The showdown in Fatah comes five months before the faction is due to hold its first elections since 1989.
During his election campaign earlier this year, Abbas, under pressure from young activists who demanded a shake-up, promised to hold elections in Fatah in August. But the young Fatah leaders fear that Abbas and veteran Fatah leaders are once again seeking to sideline them.
Fares, who met with Barghouti in prison, said the resignations were a message to the leadership to speed up serious reforms to regain the popularity that Fatah has lost in recent years.
He accused top Fatah leader Hani al-Hassan and members of the Fatah Central Committee of plotting to steal the vote in the August election.
"They are working to corrupt people in Fatah and to drive a wedge between them," he said. "They are trying to get rid of some young activists and promote others so that the old guard could continue controlling Fatah. This is totally unacceptable."
Shobaki, another rebel leader, said he and his friends were hoping that there would be more democracy in Fatah in the aftermath of Arafat's death. "Unfortunately, we have discovered that nothing has changed since Arafat's death," he said. "Fatah needs an internal revolution to reorganize its affairs on democratic bases."
Continued
1 | 2 | Next »
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1109995582046
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JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF
Vol. 3, No. 30 2 August 2004
The Palestinian Rebellion in Fatah:
Foreshadowing the Politics of the Post-Arafat Era
Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi
For the first time since the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994, popular rage aimed at the "corrupt leadership" enjoys the backing of the most powerful militia in Gaza - the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
Arafat's opponents support the holding of municipal elections and elections to the Palestinian parliament in order to remove the Old Guard from power. In this way, the leaders of the intifada hope to receive the share of power they feel they deserve, and this would also improve Mohammad Dahlan's chances of succeeding Arafat.
The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which continues to express its commitment to the armed struggle, is striving to upgrade its status from an armed militia under the command of the political leadership of Fatah to become a central political element, controlling the mother movement by force and playing a major part in the decision-making process.
Thus, this is not an ideological struggle between old Arafat-Tunis hardliners originating from outside the territories and young moderate insiders, but rather a power struggle involving a broad spectrum of Arafat opponents, many of whom are no less inflexible and militant.
The probable takeover of Fatah by its militia will create a more radical and hard-line movement with regard to settling the conflict with Israel. In light of past operational cooperation between the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Hamas, under the "Nationalist and Islamic Forces" umbrella, Hamas could become a stronger factor at a later stage by cooperating with these Fatah militants.
A Significant Challenge to Arafat
The organized protests that have recently erupted in the Gaza Strip represent a significant challenge to the leadership of Yasser Arafat. For the first time since the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1994, popular rage aimed at the "corrupt leadership" enjoys the backing of the most powerful militia in Gaza - the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades - which is the military wing of the Fatah movement headed by Arafat himself. Moreover, the criticism is being directed specifically toward Arafat for his lack of openness and his despotic way of running the PA. By late July, the revolt had spread to the West Bank cities of Jenin and Nablus.
The sequence of events in Gaza began as follows: On 16 July 2004, armed Palestinians belonging to different factions within the Fatah movement abducted and then released police commander Razi Jebali, the head of the coordination office with Israel Khalid Abu Olah, and four French humanitarian activists in Khan Yunis. A PA military intelligence facility was also set on fire by Palestinian mobs. During the next two weeks, groups of armed Palestinians rallied against the corrupt leadership of the PA, burned down a police station in the village of Zawaidah, and briefly took over the governor's office in Khan Yunis, retreating only after Arafat yielded to their demand to reinstate eleven dismissed officers.1 The escalating struggle with Arafat was also evidenced by the attempted assassination in Ramallah of former PA cabinet minister Nabil Amr, who was targeted by forces loyal to Arafat (that had threatened former PA Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas [Abu Mazen] in the past.)
The Hidden Hand of Mohammad Dahlan
Behind the rage in the Palestinian street stands the home-grown, local leadership, the Young Guard within the Fatah movement, as opposed to the Old Guard who had returned to the territories with Arafat from Tunis and elsewhere in 1994 after the Oslo Accords. Mohammad Dahlan, former head of the Preventive Security Service (PSS) in Gaza, is considered to be the hidden leader of the dissidents who defines the goals and targets, and orchestrates the rebellion by remote control.2 Dahlan appears to have successfully gathered to his side a strong coalition comprised of loyal officers in the PSS, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades operatives, the Popular Resistance Committees (a terrorist militia headed by former PSS officers), the Abu Rish militia in Rafah, and the Fatah leadership in the Gaza Strip.3
As the riots persist, more and more Palestinian politicians have dared to join the public demand for political reforms and the criticism of Arafat. Former Palestinian cabinet minister Rafiq al-Natshe said Arafat "runs a dictatorship," operates "gangs" to stay in power, and "oiled parliament members with twelve million dollars" in order to depose him from his former position.4 Hannan Ashrawi, a prominent Palestinian spokeswoman and parliament member, called for the end of Arafat's "one-man-show" and accused him of unlawfully holding control of the security forces.5 The PA Minister of Housing, Abd al-Rahman Hamad, called on Arafat to give up a portion of his security powers and appoint a strong minister of interior.
In an interview with the Beirut daily Al-Hayat (25 July 2004), Mohammad Dahlan denied any connection to the revolt in Gaza, emphasizing that his dispute is with Arafat's corrupt assistants and advisors and not with Arafat himself, whom he called the "symbol" of the Palestinian people. However, Dahlan did not hesitate to express his sympathy for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. "I am proud of defending them [Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades operatives] every time it was necessary. They are familiar [to the Palestinian people] and are proud of their heroic operations, which brought dignity to the Palestinian people."6
Despite his public denials, this is not the first time Dahlan has challenged Arafat in the past year. He has often criticized Arafat's ruling style in closed sessions, diplomatic meetings, and even in briefings with Western journalists.7 In recent months, Dahlan has urged Fatah leaders in Gaza to invigorate political life within Fatah by beginning an electoral process to select the local leadership after years of organizational stagnation - ignoring Arafat's strong opposition to such moves.8 Dahlan has also begun to go public with his criticism, charging in an interview with the Kuwaiti daily al-Watan (1 August 2004) that Arafat is sitting on "the bodies of the Palestinians and on "their ruins." He also revealed that five billion dollars in financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority over the last number of years has vanished, and that he has no idea what happened to the money.9
The initial goals of the current "rebellion" were the removal of Razi Jebali and Moussa Arafat (Arafat's nephew) from their positions of power as commanders of the Palestinian Police and the National Security Forces, respectively. Both long-time Dahlan rivals were blamed for corruption and cronyism. However, the criticism against them is only the tip of the iceberg and serves as an indication of deeper aspirations by the intriguers.
Dahlan and his counterparts, backed by Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei and parliament members, are demanding that Arafat implement comprehensive security reforms, which primarily include the reorganization of the security services under a defined hierarchy and the transfer of Arafat's security authority to the prime minister. In addition, Arafat's opponents support the holding of municipal elections and elections to the Palestinian parliament in order to remove the Old Guard from power. In this way they hope to further weaken Arafat's influence and pave the way for the leaders of the intifada to receive the share of power they feel they deserve. This would also improve Dahlan's chances of succeeding Arafat.
"The Dream of the Martyrs"
On 15 July 2004, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades published for the first time a detailed political platform under the name, "The Dream of the Martyrs," which reveals their future aspirations. The Brigades cast responsibility for the dire straits of the Palestinians on all levels of the PA leadership who were involved in corruption or in the "fruitless" peace negotiations. Defining "corruption and the [Israeli] occupation" as "two sides of the same coin," they call for establishing a judicial committee with authority to investigate all suspected Palestinian officials without any restrictions.
Even more interesting from the Israeli perspective is the Brigades' political vision. The Brigades express their commitment to the same outlook represented by Yasser Arafat, namely, the establishment of a Palestinian state up to the 1967 borders, evacuation of all Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and implementation of the "right of return" of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israel's sovereign territory. Following the Fatah ideology consistently, they announced their total commitment to pursuing the armed struggle against Israel until all Palestinian national objectives are realized, including the return of the refugees, which means the destruction of Israel by demographic means.10 Thus, this is not an ideological struggle between old Arafat-Tunis hardliners originating from outside the territories and young moderate insiders, but rather a power struggle involving a broad spectrum of Arafat opponents, many of whom are no less inflexible and militant.
Arafat is fully aware of the severe and unprecedented challenge to his leadership. Under growing domestic pressure, he consented to dismiss Razi Jebali and appointed Abd al-Razeq al-Majaidah as supreme commander of Palestinian forces in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He also canceled the new appointment of Moussa Arafat and ordered a reduction in the number of security services to three.11
Finally, in response to broad public pressure, he appeared to acquiesce to a broad reshuffle of the Palestinian cabinet and to transfer some of his own security powers to Prime Minister Qurei, who then withdrew his previous resignation.12 But this time, it seems that Arafat's tactics are not as effective as they were in the past. Arafat is finding it more difficult to please his opponents without taking into consideration their demands and giving up his security powers.
Lessons from the Current Crisis
The major lessons to be learned so far from the current crisis in Gaza are as follows:
The rebellion against Arafat serves the interests of the moderate Arab states (Egypt and Jordan) as well as Israel, the U.S., and the EU, all of whom desire to see the end of Arafat's political role or at least a significant decrease in his influence on the decision-making process.
Dahlan has strengthened his position as a national leader and as a would-be successor to Arafat. He has become identified with the reformers rather than with the old, hated regime of which he was a part for many years.
Arafat's opposition is heterogeneous and includes moderate Fatah leaders alongside the armed militias, although the two groups represent completely different political agendas. While the moderate reformers are finding in this course of events a political opportunity to promote democracy and to renew negotiations with Israel, the militias, which continue to express their commitment to the armed struggle, are striving to gain political power at the expense of the Old Guard. Thus, a victory over Arafat in this round will not necessarily lead to a new and pragmatic Palestinian line.
Israel's planned unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip has accelerated the struggle over future Palestinian rule. In this context, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is striving to upgrade its status from an armed militia under the command of the political leadership of Fatah to become a central political element, controlling the mother movement by force and playing a major part in the decision-making process.
The probable takeover of Fatah by its militia will create a more radical and hard-line movement with regard to settling the conflict with Israel. However, the moderate leaders of Fatah, reading the political map, prefer to side with the rebels and lash out at Arafat in order to clear themselves from possible accusations of corruption and connection to the "old regime."
Gaza's slide into chaos, the crumbling of the Palestinian Authority, and even the eruption of a limited Palestinian civil war have all become real and possible. The current crisis, even if contained, foreshadows the likely scenario to be expected on the day after Arafat leaves the scene.
Meanwhile, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are out of the game. At the same time, they are taking advantage of the rivalry inside of Fatah in order to emphasize their anti-corruption agenda and to demand the establishment of a supreme joint Palestinian leadership. In light of past operational cooperation between the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Hamas, under the "Nationalist and Islamic Forces" umbrella, Hamas could become a stronger factor at a later stage by cooperating with these Fatah militants. It is not surprising that Palestinian political observers from Mustapha Barghouti to Khalil Shikaki envision a unity government that integrates Palestinian Islamists into the political system.13
The Twilight of Arafat's Rule
In short, the revolt against Arafat originated from his own Fatah movement and signals the twilight of Arafat's rule. The Young Guard in Fatah is striving to force a change of generations in the leadership of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, keeping Arafat only as a "symbol" and a "spiritual leader" for the Palestinian people.
Surprisingly, at this historical junction, the interests of Israel and the new Palestinian leadership coincide, although from different approaches. The new Palestinian leadership sees in the proposed reforms and elections a golden opportunity to take over Palestinian rule. Israel, for its part, is interested primarily in stability in the Palestinian territories, in toppling Arafat, and in the establishment of a new Palestinian Authority capable of taking responsibility for security issues. Yet, after the dust settles, a Palestinian political outlook based on a "zero-sum game" may be expected to once again dominate Palestinian-Israeli relations.
* * *
Notes
1. http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART/756/345.html http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART/757/057.html http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART/759/463.html
2. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/700/re3.htm http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1090045862446
3. Ibid.
4. http://www.alhaqaeq.net/defaultch.asp?action=showarticle&secid=5&articleid=21142
5. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2952802,00.html
6. http://www.daralhayat.com/arab_news/levant_news/07-2004/20040724-25P01-03.txt/story.html
7. http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,747635,00.html
8. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/447971.html
9. "Dahlan: Arafat is Sitting on the Bodies of the Palestinians," Voice of Israel Radio, 1 August 2004 (Hebrew).
10. http://www.alhaqaeq.net/defaultch.asp?action=showarticle&secid=5&articleid=21138
11. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=6422
12. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=6667; http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=1&id=1386
13. Khalil Shikaki, "Let Us Vote," Wall Street Journal, 30 July 2004.
* * *
Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi is a researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam. His previous writings include "Is Hamas Preparing to Inherit the Palestinian Authority?" Jerusalem Issue Brief #3-14 (January 7, 2004); "Al-Qaeda's Intellectual Legacy: New Radical Islamic Thinking Justifying the Genocide of Infidels," Jerusalem Viewpoints #508 (December 1, 2003); "Who is Taking Credit for Attacks on the U.S. Army in Western Iraq? Al-Jama'a al-Salafiya al-Mujahida," Jerusalem Issue Brief #3-3 (August 5, 2003); and "Understanding the Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," Jerusalem Viewpoints #486 (September 15, 2002). The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the IDF.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaakov Amidror, ICA Program Director; Mark Ami-El, Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112, Email: jcpa [at] netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215 USA, Tel. (410) 664-5222; Fax. (410) 664-1228. Website: http://www.jcpa.org. © Copyright. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) is dedicated to providing a forum for Israeli policy discussion and debate.
To subscribe to the Jerusalem Issue Brief, please send a blank email message to: brief4-subscribe [at] jcpa.org
Earlier this week, new interior minister Gen. Nasser Yousef came under fire in Jenin. He ordered arrest of instigator local strongman Zakariye Zbeidi – but backed down.
http://www.debka.com/
If they are fighting among themselves, who's to blame? Israel, of course. Who else? The Palestinians are soooo good and the Israelis soooo bad.
Too sweeping a statement. But to move on...
>>>"...and a lot of what happening in the West Bank and Gaza can be seen in that light. he problem in this case for Israel is that dividing Palestinians"<<<
Intra-Palestinian forces are now at work seemingly on the brink of serious turmoil in which they might clash -- strife that hasn't been nurtured by Israel.
>>>" he problem in this case for Israel is that dividing Palestinians at a time when peace looks possible is not in anyone's interest except for those who want fighting to continue forever,"<<<
Obviously peace seems possible to those hordes of people who're willing to overlook all the attacks and attempted terror attacks on Israelis, provided they don't label Israel's measures attempting to thwart those attacks as warfare.
Gunmen clash with PA police in Nablus
By ASSOCIATED PRESS
A Palestinian youth jumps over burning tires during clashes with Israeli security forces in the outskirts of the West Bank village of Beit Surik, near Ramallah, Friday.
Photo: AP
Advertisement
NABLUS, West Bank
Disgruntled Palestinian gunmen opened fire at a police station on Friday, sparking a gunfight that left three people wounded, as recent tensions between the Palestinian Authority and maverick terrorist groups erupted into armed violence.
It was the second serious incident of violence between Palestinian authorities and armed groups this week, underscoring the delicate task that Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas faces as he tries to rein in gunmen and restore law and order in the West Bank.
Abbas has been trying to persuade armed men to lay down their weapons while resisting calls from Israel and the international community for a crackdown. Pressure on the Palestinian leader to take tougher action increased since a Palestinian suicide bomber from the West Bank killed five Israelis in Tel Aviv last weekend.
Witnesses in Nablus said at least 13 gunmen took up positions outside the police station on Friday afternoon and began shooting, prompting police to return fire. Hospital officials said three people were wounded in the clash, one seriously.
"I heard loud noises and gunfire," said Mohammed Zohel, a witness to the clash. "I thought the Israelis had gone into the police station, but later I saw it was gunmen fighting the police. It is a real war and very frightening."
The gunmen belonged to al Awda, a small terrorist group affiliated with Abbas' ruling Fatah party. Representatives of the group said they took action in response to police attempts to arrest one of their members who was driving a stolen car. But a police spokesman said the group was upset that one of its members had been beaten while in police custody.
Abbas tried to play down Friday's incident, saying Israel's continued presence in Palestinian population centers has hindered his ability to take action. Israel agreed at a Mideast summit last month to pull out of five West Bank towns, but the handover was frozen after last week's suicide bombing.
"We hope that Israeli will withdraw soon from these cities so that we can control security in these cities," Abbas said outside his home in Ramallah. "As long as the Israeli army is in the Palestinian West Bank, there will be breeches and we will deal with it."
Earlier this week, tensions between the Palestinian Authority and the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, a larger terrorist group linked with Fatah, erupted into a confrontation in the nearby town of Jenin.
The incident came as the Palestinian interior minister was visiting Jenin. A popular local gunman, Zakariya Zubeidi, irate that the minister had come to the town without his permission, opened fire on a building where he was holding meetings.
Yousef ordered the arrest of Zubeidi, who is seen by residents as the ruler of Jenin, but quickly backed down.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1109906438003&p=1101615860782
Special Information
Bulletin
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S) February 10, 2005
Iran and Hezbollah as instigators of terrorism in the Palestinian Authority-administered territories: high-ranking officials in the PA claim Hezbollah recently increased its efforts to disrupt the calm in the PA-administered territories by encouraging its operatives there to escalate their activities
Overview
1. During the past year Iran and Hezbollah have increasingly stepped up the activation of Palestinian terrorist operatives in Israel and the PA-administered territories with the intention of sustaining and fomenting the ongoing violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation . Political and security officials in the PA told reporters from Reuters and the AP that efforts had recently been increased to disrupt the current calm and to sabotage Abu Mazen's attempts to enter into a dialogue with Israel .
2. To put an end to the Hezbollah activity, which also sabotages Abu Mazen's and the PA's efforts to suppress manifestations of anti-Israeli violence , the PA has initiated a media attack by leaking information off the record to expose the methods used by Hezbollah to incite terrorist operatives in the PA-administered territories to further violence .
3. In addition, a Palestinian delegation headed by ‘ Abd al-Fattah Hamail , a former PA Minister, was sent to Beirut to meet high-ranking Hezbollah members in an attempt to clamp down on Hezbollah terrorists in the PA-administered territories (so far, Hezbollah sources have denied the meeting took place).
Hezbollah methods in the PA-administered territories exposed through leaks to the media.
4. Examples of the PA's media attack on Hezbollah can be found in reports given to Reuters and AP reporters in Ramallah by high-ranking political and security officials and terrorists who have discontinued their terrorist activity.
a. “Senior political and security officials” in the Palestinian Authority told a Reuters reporter (on February 9, 2005) about increased Hezbollah efforts to escalate terrorist attacks in the PA-administered territories :
“Hezbollah has been trying to recruit suicide bombers” from among Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades terrorists “to carry out attacks which would sabotage the truce” (for example, a recent attack in Nablus , which Palestinians said had been perpetrated by Hezbollah).
“Another official said intercepted email communications and bank transactions suggested Hezbollah had raised its cash offers to militants [i.e., Palestinian terrorists]…and are now willing to pay $100,000 for a whole operation (suicide bombing) whereas in the past they paid $20,000 …”
“One top Palestinian official said security services were investigating Hezbollah funding for militants [i.e., Palestinian terrorists] in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip .” Another said clear links had been identified through intercepted communications [between Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorists].
b. The Palestinian security apparatus and gunmen in [i.e., terrorist operatives] the West Bank told an AP reporter in Ramallah that Hezbollah was the worst threat there was on the truce with Israel . The reporter wrote (February 9, 2005) that:
Officials in the Palestinian security apparatus noted that “[Hezbollah, which has] hundreds of West Bank gunmen on their payroll, [has] stepped up pressure on them in recent weeks ,” and “ offering thousands of dollars to step up attacks on Israelis. ”
“ One retired militant [i.e., Palestinian terrorist] told the AP that a Hezbollah recruiter called him just a day before the Mideast summit in Egypt, told him the cease-fire wouldn't last and offered him a generous payment if he returns [sic] to violence . A squad of five or six militants typically receives $5,000 to $8,000 a month for expenses, including bullets, weapons, cell phone calling cards and spending money.”
“ Majed [‘Ali Muhammad] Faraj , a top official in the Palestinian Interior Ministry, said ‘ There are foreign parties who are trying to create bases in Palestine ,' but did not refer to Hezbollah directly.” He said that “this has a political dimension and the Palestinian Authority will not allow” the activities of those foreign parties .
“ A former militant [i.e., Palestinian terrorist] in the West Bank city of Ramallah ” told AP that “a Hezbollah recruiter called him [on February 7] a day before the summit, and urged him to resume attacks . The recruiter said the cease-fire wouldn't last long … and promised to cover all [the terrorist's] expenses, buying bullets and weapons .” He also said that “Hezbollah is trying to recruit members of the Palestinian security forces as allies.”
A top Palestinian police official in charge of watching extremists said that Hezbollah regularly uses email to monitor the bank accounts of its members in the West Bank and the names of those who carried out attacks. He said that he monitored some of the email traffic and that the Palestinian Monetary Authority was watching the bank transfers from Hezbollah to Palestinian terrorists. He noted that he briefed Palestinian leaders on Hezbollah's activities but had not received an order to step in or make arrests .
Dispatching a Palestinian delegation to Lebanon
5. Because of that situation, Abu Mazen, the current chairman of the Palestinian Authority sent a delegation to Beirut headed by former Minister ‘Abd al-Fattah Hamail , which was supposed to meet with senior Hezbollah members . “Palestinian sources” reported that the delegation met with members of the Hezbollah leadership and the field commanders of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. However, Hezbollah sources, and even ‘Abd al-Fattah Hamail himself, denied that the Palestinian delegation and the Hezbollah leadership had met (Al-Arabia TV, February 9, 2005).
‘Abd al-Fattah Hamail
6. In addition, Jibril al-Rajoub, senior Palestinian security adviser said, after a previous visit in Beirut, he was confident that Hezbollah would not sabotage the efforts to reach a truce because it would respect the Palestinian leadership's commitment to a cease-fire (Reuters, February 9, 2005).
A call to Syria to stop its support of Hezbollah, which poses to threat to the peace process
7. During her visit in France (February 8, 2005) American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted that Damascus should stop its support of terrorist groups in Lebanon, by implication Hezbollah, which posed a threat to the peace process . She said that the American government was examining ways to do more when it came to imposing sanction on Damascus in light of the “Syrian responsibility law.” Visiting in Italy, Rice reiterated the American position that Syria had to stop serving as a haven for terrorist operatives harmful to the peace process .
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah: The “active resistance” will continue and will not surrender to threats
The resistance, my brothers and sisters, does not act impulsively…
8. The Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said in Beirut: “This is a year of devotion to resistance, of maintaining resistance of and insisting on resistance, that is our choice, our faith and our way, and our national, pan-Arab and Islamic activity… (Al-Manar, the Hezbollah satellite TV station in Lebanon, February 9, 2005).
your obsession on israel--not to mention your incredulity in the face of its propaganda machine--probably would respond to psychiatric intervention.
your obsession on Islamo Fascism--not to mention your incredulity in the face of its propaganda machine--probably would respond to psychiatric intervention.
Palestinian gunmen break up Fatah meeting
By ASSOCIATED PRESS
RAMALLAH, West Bank
More than 20 Palestinian gunmen burst into a large gathering of the ruling Fatah party on Thursday, ordering people out of the building and firing shots into the air.
Roughly 1,200 Fatah activists had gathered in a Ramallah hotel to discuss upcoming parliamentary elections when the gunmen burst into the building, said Dimitri Diliani, a party activist from Jerusalem.
The gunmen broke chairs, ordered everyone out of the building and fired shots into the air outside the building, he said. No one was injured, but the meeting did not resume.
The gunmen were part of Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, a violent group loosely affiliated with Fatah.
Menwer al Aqraa, an Aqsa commander in Ramallah, accused the meeting participants of being corrupt and conspiring against the late Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat. "Our demands are for change and reform," he said, without elaborating.
He said, however, that his group remains loyal to the Palestinian Authority.
Al Aqraa said his group will not disarm, but would continue to respect an informal truce with Israel.
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