INTELLIGENT COMMENTARY FROM AROUND THE WORLD

October 10, 2001

AMERICA RETALIATES
REVIEW OF INTELLIGENT COMMENTARY FROM AROUND THE WORLD
by Srdja Trifkovic

We start with Britain, as usual, and an original look at the Osama phenomenon in the Daily Telegraph (“Forget Islam: bin Laden is no more than a spoilt rich kid” by Robert Harris, October 9). “If you want to understand Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'eda organisation,” Harris says, “my advice is to put the newspapers aside for a while and get hold of a novel published in 1907. The Secret Agent by Joseph Conrad describes the activities of a small group of state-sponsored terrorists, plotting an atrocity against a world-famous building--in this case, the Greenwich Observatory.” Instead of Osama, Conrad gives us the terrorist leader Ossipon, alias “The Professor.” He walks around with explosives strapped to his body beneath an overcoat, which he can detonate at any time by releasing an india-rubber ball in a pocket. This “astonishingly prescient novel” ends with a brilliant final paragraph, as Ossipon walks along a London street:


And the incorruptible Professor walked, too, averting his eyes from the odious multitude of mankind. He had no future. He disdained it. He was a force. His thoughts caressed the images of ruin and destruction. He walked frail, insignificant, shabby, miserable--and terrible in the simplicity of his idea, calling madness and despair to the regeneration of the world. Nobody looked at him. He passed on, unsuspected and deadly, like a pest in the street full of men.

Ossipon is a 20th-century anarchist, Harris says, while Osama a 21st-century religious fanatic, but their philosophical trappings are only useful drapery--like the professor's overcoat--designed to conceal what really motivates both men: a vast rage against the all-powerful Western world. When Conrad describes Ossipon as having “a frenzied puritanism of ambition: he nursed it as something secularly holy,” or dreaming of “a telling stroke [that] would be delivered--something really startling--a blow fit to open the first crack in the imposing front of the great edifice of legal conceptions sheltering the atrocious injustice of society”--he might be writing of Osama:


Watching bin Laden's video statement on Sunday night--the self-assured fanatic, calmly sipping tea in an Afghan ravine--it was hard not to think of the cafes of Zurich and Geneva before 1914, where one could have seen similar characters lingering over their coffee and cream buns, plotting the destruction of authority. Like bin Laden, the violent anarchists and the extreme Marxist revolutionaries of a century ago were usually well-to-do, exiled opponents of autocratic regimes: men whose private incomes financed a lifetime indulgence in political struggle.

To Harris, the abiding impression left by Osama’s “Bond-villain videotape” was the man’s egomania. “He beheld all his enemies,” wrote Conrad of Ossipon, “and fearlessly confronted them all in a supreme satisfaction of his vanity. They stood perplexed before him as if before a dreadful portent.” That, Harris concludes, is what bin Laden would like us to do: “to take him on his own terms, as the just instrument of divine wrath, instead of seeing him for what he really is--a spoilt rich kid, a social misfit, a vainglorious crank, a bigot, a pest in a street full of men.”



The Independent’s Robert Fisk suspects that there may be more to Bin Laden than irrational, lethal rage. “A few months ago, my old friend Tom Friedman set off for the small Gulf emirate of Qatar,” Fisk says (“Lost in the rhetorical fog of war,” October 9), “from where, in one of his messianic columns for the New York Times, he informed us that the tiny state’s Al-Jazeera satellite channel was a welcome sign that democracy might be coming to the Middle East.” Apparently Al-Jazeera’s coverage and commentary had been upsetting some of the local Arab dictators--President Mubarak of Egypt for one--and Mr. Friedman thought this a good idea:


But hold everything. The story is being rewritten. Last week the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell rapped the Emir of Qatar over the knuckles because--so he claimed--Al-Jazeera was "inciting anti-Americanism" So, goodbye democracy. The Americans want the emir to close down the channel’s office in Kabul which is scooping the world with tape of the US bombardments and--more to the point--with televised statements by Osama bin Laden. The most wanted man in the whole world has been suggesting that he’s angry about the deaths of Iraqi children under sanctions, about the corruption of pro-western Arab regimes, about Israel’s attacks on the Palestinian territory, about the need for US forces to leave the Middle East. And after insisting that bin Laden is a "mindless terrorist"--that there is no connection between US policy in the Middle East and the crimes against humanity in New York and Washington--the Americans need to close down Al-Jazeera’s coverage.

Needless to say, Fisk points out, “this tomfoolery by Colin Powell has not been given much coverage in the Western media”-- because journalists are falling back on the same sheep-like conformity that they adopted in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo war. Some journalists are striving “to unlink the bin Laden phenomenon from the West’s baleful history in the Middle East” --so that when the terrifying details of the hijacker Mohamed Atta's will, dated April 1996, were published on October 1, no one could think of any event that month that might have propelled Atta to his murderous behaviour:


Not the Israeli bombardment of southern Lebanon, nor the Qana massacre by Israeli artillery of 106 Lebanese civilians in a UN base, more than half of them children. For that’s what happened in April, 1996. No, of course that slaughter is not excuse for the crimes against humanity in the United States last month. But isn’t it worth just a little mention, just a tiny observation, that an Egyptian mass-murderer-to-be wrote a will of chilling suicidal finality in the month when the massacre in Lebanon enraged Arabs across the Middle East? . . . Must we, because of our rage at the massacre of the innocents in America, because of our desire to cowtow to the elderly "terrorism experts", must we lose all our critical faculties? Why at least not tell us how these ‘terrorism experts’ came to be so expert? And what are their connections with dubious intelligence services?

Fisk concludes that some of the men giving us their advice on screen are the very same operatives who steered the CIA and the FBI into the greatest intelligence failure in modern history: the inability to uncover the plot, four years in the making, to destroy the lives of some six thousand people.



Fisk’s colleague on the Independent Chris Blackhurst noted two days earlier that “crucial facts from the official charge sheet against Bin Laden” are missing. On October 7 he wrote that Prime Minister Tony Blair’s much-heralded evidence of Osama’s culpability was disappointing:


Close analysis of the 21-page document put out by the Government on Thursday reveals a report of conjecture, supposition and unsubstantiated assertions of fact. It uses every trick in the Whitehall drafter's arsenal to make the reader believe they are reading something they are not: a damning indictment of Mr bin Laden for the events of 11 September . . . [T]he dossier was seen as vital to gaining the approval of a naturally cautious and sceptical British public. As a paper produced by mandarins anxious to brook no argument it is a classic of its kind, straight from the script of Yes Minister: short on checkable detail; long on bold assertion; highly selective with the choice of facts.

Officials when they prepare such reports operate to a set of principles, Blackhurst says. They know that unlike the US, and thanks to their efforts in suppressing freedom of information down the years, Britain is a secret society (“We are not used to having anything presented to us about intelligence matters and threats to national security”). That, plus the British characteristic of not defying authority, especially in times of crisis, means that if the Government says loudly enough that something is ‘evidence,’ even if it is not, the British will accept it as such:


That is why the very first sentence in the paper, in the introduction, states: "The clear conclusions reached by the government are: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida, the terrorist network which he heads, planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001." This is the introduction, not the conclusion or an executive summary. Introductions, as the authors knew too well, normally set up a document, relating the background as to why the book or, in this instance, a government document, has been written. Here, that convention was rejected.

The 21-page document carries a health warning that intelligence material has been withheld to protect the safety of sources and that the additional evidence is "too sensitive to release" but for page after page the paper spews out old facts:


It is not until page 18 and paragraph 61 that the reader is told something new about 11 September. This is that three of the 19 hijackers have been "positively identified as associates of Al Qaida" and that one of them "has been identified as playing key roles in both the East African embassy attacks and the USS Cole attack". The word "associates" suggests the authorities lack intelligence on al-Qa’ida: they think they know who may be involved but they are not sure, and they are not certain where they come in the pecking order--hence the catch-all, "associates"

In the final narrative, paragraph, 69 asserts that “No other organisation has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks like those of the 11 September--only the Al Qaida network under Osama bin Laden.” This smacks of exasperation, Blackhurst concludes: “This, in the end, is what the paper is for, a Government plea for trust: it was Mr. bin Laden. To which the response must be: we believe you--but prove it.

Writing in The Guardian on October 4, Philip Knightley warned that “Western media follow a depressingly familiar formula when it comes to the preparation of a nation for conflict”: stage one, the crisis; stage two, the demonization of the enemy's leader; stage three, the demonisation of the enemy as individuals; and stage four, atrocities:

At the moment we are at stages two and three: efforts to show that not only Osama bin Laden and the Taliban are fanatical and cruel but that most Afghans - even many Muslims - are as well. We are already through stage one, the reporting of a crisis which negotiations appear unable to resolve. Politicians, while calling for diplomacy, warn of military retaliation. The media reports this as "We’re on the brink of war", or "War is inevitable" . . . We now enter stage two of the pattern--the demonisation of the enemy's leader. Comparing the leader with Hitler is a good start because of the instant images that Hitler’s name provokes. So when George Bush Sr likened Iraq's takeover of Kuwait with the Nazi blitzkrieg in Europe in the 1930s, the media quickly took up the theme. Saddam Hussein was painted as a second Hitler, hated by his own people and despised in the Arab world. Equally, in the Kosovo conflict, the Serbs were portrayed as Nazi thugs intent on genocide and words like ‘Auschwitz-style furnaces’ and ‘Holocaust’ were used.

The crudest approach, says Knightley, is to suggest that the leader is insane. Saddam Hussein was “a deranged psychopath,” Milosevic was mad, and the Spectator recently headlined an article on Osama bin Laden: “Inside the mind of the maniac.” Those who publicly question any of this can expect an even stronger burst of abuse. Columnist Christopher Hitchens thus wrote in the Spectator article, ‘Damn the doves,’ that “intellectuals who seek to understand the new enemy are no friends of peace, democracy or human life.” And finally, the third stage in the pattern is the demonization not only of the leader but of his people:


The simplest way of doing this is the atrocity story. The problem is that although many atrocity stories are true--after all, war itself is an atrocity--many are not . . . A defector from the Taliban’s secret police told a reporter in Quetta, Pakistan, that he was commanded to "find new ways of torture so terrible that the screams will frighten crows from their nests". The defector then listed a series of chilling forms of torture that he said he and his fellow officers developed. "Nowhere else in the world has such barbarity and cruelty as Afghanistan." The story rings false and defectors of all kinds are well-known for telling interviewers what they think they want to hear. On the other hand, it might be true. The trouble is, how can we tell? The media demands that we trust it but too often that trust has been betrayed.

The following day the Guardian’s editorialist concluded that in the improbable event that Osama bin Laden ever faces a formal prosecution “the case against him that was published by the British government yesterday would be almost worthless” from a legal point of view:

More than three weeks after the Bush administration said it would produce the evidence against bin Laden, the reality is that Mr. Blair's case comes down to two words: trust me. In a way, though, this is all beside the point. Events are now moving at a pace and in a direction which have left these sort of proper concerns well astern. The issue is not so much whether bin Laden did it, as what is to be done about bin Laden. Even so, the difficulty of producing an overwhelming case against bin Laden in public is still a political problem, not just a legal one, especially in the Islamic streets. It narrows the moral high ground, it provides ammunition for those who want to accuse the United States of arrogance, and it narrows the scope for error and bad judgment in the U.S.-dominated response.

The staid and cautious Financial Times commented on October 4 that Blair has failed to prove Bin Laden’s alleged guilt even in the political terms that fall short of legal requirements, and that after his sorry performance Washington needed to take over that task from him:

Blair’s declaration shows that there is still a need to make the case for the prosecution. The U.S. administration should now disclose, in some form, the evidence of Mr bin Laden’s culpability. The reasons for demonstrating his guilt are political rather than judicial. We cannot expect at this stage the exacting standards of proof required by a court of law. In the run-up to military action, sources must be protected and the most sensitive details withheld. Providing an outline of the evidence will not satisfy everybody but it will help to reassure many . . . Fuller evidence must also be provided to leaders in the broader coalition, particularly to crucial allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They must be convinced if they are to remain reliable partners. America’s right to defend itself is not subject to an international tribunal. But the United States and its allies should demonstrate convincingly that their verdict is the right one.

Quite apart from the “case” against bin Laden, and contrary to the view promulgated from Washington and London, efforts to enlist Arab countries in the “war on terrorism” have met with only limited success so far, the Guardian warned on October 2. Its editorial argued that real success demands a shift in the U.S. policy in the Middle East:

While most Middle East governments make supportive noises, Arab public opinion is broadly hostile to U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan or anywhere else… Washington does have the means to rally its Arab conscripts. For if this crisis has crystallized one, single reality, it is that the Palestinian struggle, not anti-American terrorist conspiracy, is seen as the primary, legitimate battlefront by Arab peoples and leaders alike . . . In a world that Washington declares has changed forever, U.S. thinking on Palestine must now change forever, too. If Mr. Bush is not merely paying expedient lip service to Arab opinion; if he is sincere in trying to bridge the supposed schism with Islam; if he really hopes to strike at the roots of the anti-Western anger that feeds terrorist violence and boost his shaky Arab allies, he should invite Arafat to Washington and set a timetable for a final settlement, including U.S. recognition of a Palestinian state.

In Canada Globe & Mail’s columnist Rick Salutin lamented that “if truth is the first casualty in war, I guess we can now say humor is the second” (“The Fear of Thinking,” October 5):

Poor Bill Maher of Politically Incorrect continues to be pilloried in the U.S., from the White House down, for bravely raising questions on what cowardice and bravery are. Jay Leno, David Letterman and Saturday Night Live agonize over how hard it is to be funny in times like these, and do they dare? . . . On the upside, Frank magazine has not shirked its duty to deal with the grim realities, nor has the American humour mag The Onion ("Hugging up 76,000%"; "U.S urges bin Laden to form nation it can attack").

Many of us tend to associate funny with smart, Salutin writes, and on that basis he nominated as the third casualty thought itself, “especially when it's sharp and critical”:

Listen to this call not to think from the National Post: "If we are to be a reliable partner… our ruling caste must disabuse itself of the fallacy that to be a good Canadian, one must be skeptical or even hostile to America." Must not be skeptical-- when thinking about a crucial national issue? . . . It’s as if a set of official propositions has been laid down: We are good. They are evil. It's a war. Only one side can survive. No other factors or analysis apply. Those who don't accept these propositions are fools or worse. Anyone skeptical about these articles of faith, better watch it. I'm not saying the mood is universal--happily it isn't--but it's out there.

Thought is also the enemy of radical terror, like suicide bombings, Salutin says: Shakespeare dealt a lot with this function of thought. Macbeth and Hamlet have disabling doubts not before they decide to act violently but between then and the deed. T. S. Eliot wrote, "Between the idea / And the reality / Between the motion / And the act / Falls the Shadow." In the meantime, the price we pay is vast restriction of our freedoms and suppression of debate, all in the name of the war against terror:


The critique of globalization gets cut off, for instance, and so do Bill Maher's wry cracks. Neither has anything to do with terror, but it's almost impossible for those in power to resist the chance to stifle protest and advance their agenda. It's the Cold War all over again, when "anti-communism" was used to shut down almost all opposition, at home and abroad. What can we do except: Keep thinking, keep doubting, grit your teeth and laugh right through them.

In France, Gerard Dupuy held in left-of-center Liberation (9/29):

America's reaction to the September 11 attacks is exactly the opposite of the ill-intended caricature (of America) that is often offered in the form of a big and impulsive bully. On the contrary we are discovering a methodical and patient approach. This restraint is upsetting to the most bellicose among public opinion, who would prefer to see a more aggressive Uncle Sam. Yet, we can take President Bush seriously: the United States will succeed no matter how long it takes.

Across the Rhine Klaus-Juergen Haller commented on Westdeutscher Rundfunk of Cologne (10/4) and Norddeutscher Rundfunk of Hamburg (10/4) that the attack on September 11 has created a totally new framework for international relations:

President Bush is not the clueless deputy sheriff who only understands how to shoot from the hip . . . The decisive term is called "coalition." For the United States, however, this means the end to all unilateral moves--and the end to free rides for the rest of the world.

Barbara Roth was complimentary to U.S. policymakers in her comments on national radio station DeutschlandRadio of Berlin (10/5):

There is no doubt that the Americans will remain the leading power. But with great pain, they had to learn that they have to share this leadership, and this requires joint responsibility. This is first of all true for the partners in NATO In this respect, the German government plays an outstanding role in two respects. Germany’s good relations with Russia became clear again during Putin’s recent visit to Germany.

Holger Schmale observed in the Berliner Zeitung (10/5) that the United States has underlined again that is making all truly important decisions alone - despite its efforts aimed at building international agreement:

The relationship between the United States and its NATO partners has become even more clearly that between the ordering party and its service providers. The United States is picking and choosing which of the proffered goods and services it can use, as if in a supermarket. This has little to do with partnership. The only exception are the British. It appears as if they are the only ones the United States trusts enough militarily and in matters of political reliability and discipline.

Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger opined on the front page of Frankfurter Allgemeine (10/4):

After September 11, nothing will ever be the same again. Indeed, after President Putin's visit to Berlin and now in Brussels, nothing seems to be impossible any more. With a fine grasp for the situation, Putin is seizing the opportunity that has been offered to him as a much sought after partner . . . He obviously expects Russia's participation in the war against terrorism to generate an excellent dividend. Putting Russia at the center of European security policy, this is a legitimate interest and it is worth protecting the links to Russia that NATO has already forged and the EU now wishes to create.

Washington correspondent Leo Wieland reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine on October 1 that “three weeks after the attacks on New York and Washington, we cannot recognize too much of warmongery in the United States”:

All of a sudden, new parameters are decisive for George W. Bush's foreign policy, whose effects on unsettled issues such as NATO enlargement or missile defense are not yet foreseeable. Russian support was paid with concessions concerning Chechnya. The semi-ostracized nuclear power in Pakistan can expect a kind of "Marshall Plan." Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are no longer measured with the human rights yardstick, and the same is true for future cooperation with China . . . The United Nations repaid the U.S payment of arrears with a unanimous resolution of the UN Security Council which obliges all UN members to cooperate in the fight against terrorism.

Stefan Kornelius noted in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung of Munich (9/29) that the old boundaries of alliances and security policy will now have to be reconsidered:

There is a new political framework for countries like Russia whose president is making use of this opportunity in order to escape the old Cold War polarity and declare his support for the West… There is also a new role for the EU: With limited foreign policy influence but with considerable economic strength, the EU can play only a limited role on the global stage. Nevertheless, it will have to keep its own house in order. The United States will no longer want to take charge in the Balkans… The United States will realize that it cannot escape its role as global political architect, but also that it cannot forge alliances for reasons of opportunism.

In Italy, Franco Venturini analyzed in Corriere della Sera on Bush's remarks on a Palestinian state (10/3) and concluded that Bush's message is aimed at would-be allies in the Arab world, but also at the warring parties in the Middle East:

What America is saying to the Sharon government is that it will not abandon it, but also that Israel must do its part in order to make the resumption of the negotiations . . . The United States is saying to Arafat that his space for maneuvering is limited: if the most extremist Palestinian groups are really isolated, if deeds finally follow words, America will intervene to seek a fair--and not just useful--peace. Will Bush's signals produce results? Experience suggests caution, but this would not be the first time that a global war shapes a local peace.

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